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Contrary to the prediction of modernization theory, the vibrant Chinese economy and its 
growing middle class have not brought democratic change to the authoritarian country. This 
work sheds light on the puzzle of the absence of democracy in China despite a fast-growing 
middle class. The study argues that the key to explaining the middle class’ inert political 
behavior is to be found in its fragmentation. It is necessary to disaggregate the political, 
economic, and social positions of different subgroups of the Chinese middle class—government 
officials and party cadres, private entrepreneurs of small or medium businesses, professionals, 
and white-collar employees—and the tension among these subgroups. These groups have 
different interests and so different attitudes toward democratic change. Moreover, the state has 
astute ways of managing these middle-class subgroups, and that, too, plays an important role in 
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Beginning in 1978, China implemented economic reforms to revive and modernize its economy, 
which was severely disrupted during the Cultural Revolution. With its economic reforms, China 
transformed itself from a country with a backward planned economy into one of the major 
economic powers of the world. According to a 2018 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, 
China is the world’s second largest economy with a nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of 
$13.5 trillion and the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity. Along with its 
remarkable economic development, Chinese society has undergone a significant transformation as 
well. In the increasingly modernized society, a new middle class has emerged as a prominent 
socioeconomic force. Observing these changes in China, scholars have long wondered if there 
would be ensuing democratic changes because, according to the deeply influential modernization 
theory, economic development and democracy are closely related. As Seymour Martin Lipset 
stated, “All the various aspects of economic development—industrialization, urbanization, wealth 
and education—are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political 
correlate of democracy” (Lipset 1960: 41). However, apart from a failed attempt of 
democratization in 1989, the Chinese society has not experienced major democratic evolution, and 
China remains an authoritarian country. It is a puzzle why economic growth and a growing middle 
class have not ushered in political change. 
After reviewing the general literature on the correlation between the middle class, 
especially the Chinese middle class, and democratization, some important questions present 
themselves: Does modernization theory apply to a late-developing, authoritarian country such as 
China? What is the explanation for the absence of democratization in China despite significant 
economic development? What role does the Chinese middle class play in the non-existence of 
democratization in China? The answers to these three questions are directly connected with the 
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understanding of the interactive dynamics between economic development and political 
democratization, and of the middle class’ political attitude toward democratization. However, 
scholars share no clear consensus about the correlation between economic development and the 
middle class’ support for democratic change. Moreover, most of the studies on middle class and 
democratization deem the middle class as an aggregate without systematically analyzing the 
nuanced layers of the middle class and distinguishing different subgroups and their distinct stance 
on Chinese politics.  
To further the study on the middle class and democratization, and shed light on the puzzle 
of the absence of democratization in an economically developed China, this study uses the 
theoretical literature on the middle class and politics as intellectual guidance, and examines the 
case of the Chinese middle class. The study also analyzes the political, economic, and social 
positions of different subgroups of the middle class—government officials and party cadres, 
private entrepreneurs of small or medium businesses, professionals, and white-collar employees—
and the tension among these subgroups, and explains their different attitudes toward potential 
democratic change. Based on empirical evidence found from multiple sources, including academic 
literature and information from newspapers and magazines, this work argues that the middle class 
in China is fragmented and does not have a consensus on democratization. Above all, what 
contributes to the lack of middle-class consensus in China is the attitude of subgroups that are 
dependent on the state. The astute ways in which the authoritarian state manages middle-class 
subgroups also plays an important role in hindering the formation of the consensus.  
The first part of the study reviews the theoretical literature on the middle class and 
democratization, and the literature exploring the correlation between the Chinese middle class and 
China’s potential democratization. The second part of the work examines the formation of the 
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Chinese middle class from a historical point of view. It discusses the political, economic, and social 
context in which the Chinese middle class was born. Moreover, the study explains the ways in 
which the middle class is defined and gives its definition of the class. The third part of the study 
analyzes subgroups of the Chinese middle class, their different interests and relations with the state, 
and the tension among these subgroups. The work also elaborates on what hinders the Chinese 
middle class from forming a consensus on democratization and under which circumstances a 
consensus can be formed. The last part of the study summarizes the arguments made, examines 
the prospect of the Chinese middle class and democratization, and discusses the implications of 
the study for theorizing about the middle class.  
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Theories on the Middle Class and Democratization  
There is a large body of literature that discusses topics such as the correlation between the middle 
class and democratization, the middle class’ attitude toward democracy, and the role of the middle 
class during democratic change. Scholars hold different views. However, there are two major 
perspectives on the dynamics between the middle class and democratization.  
The first perspective contends that socioeconomic modernization leads to an expansive and 
more liberal middle class, which, in turn, usually show strong support for democracy and plays an 
important role in propelling democratization. Lipset’s (1961) modernization theory is the epitome 
of this perspective. According to Lipset, socioeconomic development led to the growth of middle 
class in the democratic countries of Western Europe. Strong democratic countries have strong 
economies and a large middle class with more purchasing power. Weak and authoritarian states 
tend to have weak economies and a small middle class with less purchasing power. Therefore, a 
modernization process is closely related to the rise of a liberal middle class and a democratic 
political system. Lipset also identifies various preconditions of modernization and democratization, 
which include industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education. These conditions are closely 
related as one major force that leads up to democratic change. To Lipset, the correlation between 
economic development and democratization is inexorable. However, his theory cannot explain the 
absence of democracy in China and in other developing countries that have a fast-growing 
economy.  
Agreeing with Lipset’s theory, Diamond (2008) addresses the positive impact of economic 
development on democratization from a socio-behavioral point of view. He contends that as a 
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country becomes wealthier, more industrialized, urban, and better educated, public values in a 
society becomes more conducive to democracy. Moreover, people have higher income and become 
more informative: “They become more politically aware and confident, more inclined to 
participate in politics, to think for themselves, and thus to break free of traditional patron–client 
ties” (99).  
In the same vein, Huntington (1991) shows the impact of modernization on 
democratization in Asian states that were experiencing rapid economic growth from 1974 to 1990. 
He puts emphasis on the predominant economic conditions that led to democratization. In his study, 
Huntington contends that continuing economic development and a growing middle class 
undermined authoritarian regimes, which caused these regimes to either choose liberalization or 
repress democratization. Differing from Lipset, Huntington does not see democratization as an 
inevitable result of economic development. “An overall correlation exists between the level of 
economic development and democracy, yet no level or pattern of economic development is in itself 
either necessary or sufficient to bring about democratization” (59). To Huntington, the relation 
between economic development and democratization is complex and may change due to temporal 
and spatial factors. However, he believes the significant impact of economic development on 
democratization in those Asian states.  
Concurring with Huntington’s view, Hattori, Funatsu, and Torii’s (2003) study of the 
emergence of the Asian middle class and their characteristics makes the same observation. They 
argue that when a society is undergoing modernization, its citizens’ income, education, social 
mobility, appreciation of freedom grow simultaneously. All these changes, in turn, propel a 
transition to democracy. They believe that the rising middle class embodies these pro-democracy 
changes, and that it is the “main thrust of the democratization movement” (129–30). 
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A second perspective about the political role of the middle class argues that there is a 
dynamic interaction between economic development and democratization, and that 
“democratization is not a natural result of economic growth, it is a political process fraught with 
conflict, negotiations, and occasionally setbacks” (Dickson 2003: 12). In this line of theory, the 
middle class’ support for democratization is conditional and dependent on certain important 
economic and political conditions in a given society. Moreover, studies along this line focus more 
on the interactive dynamics between the middle class and other classes in a society, which also 
shape the possibility of democratization in a country.  
The most prominent study of this perspective is Moore’s (1966) structuralist theory. Using 
different cases, Moore analyzes the dynamic structures of power in different countries that were 
conducive to democratization and sees the middle class as a potential force for democratic 
transformation and an intervening variable. He famously states, “No bourgeoisie, no democracy” 
(418). Moore also emphasizes the important role of the middle class’ alliance with other social 
groups during a democratic transformation. Furthermore, Moore identifies conditions that 
contributed to the bourgeois revolutions. He argues that the landowners and bourgeoisie should be 
both strong and independent enough to limit the arbitrary powers of the aristocracy through 
regulations and other means, which put constraints on kings as well as gain more rights and wealth. 
It was also important that the coalition be against the aristocracy and not the peasant and worker, 
or it would be unfavorable to democracy. Moore’s study laid the ground for a structuralist theory 
and inspired many later studies on the middle class and democracy. 
Drawing upon Moore’s theory, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) propose a 
class-structural model and emphasize the importance of social class in democratization. They 
create a “relative class power” model of democratization and perceive social class as the “master 
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key” (5) that defines the chance for coalition. They studied South American societies and 
distinguished social classes that were important in determining the regime type of a country: 
working class, rural and urban middle class, landlord class, and bourgeoisie. They see different 
types of capitalist development as the determinant of the structure of class power in a country, 
which directly results in a certain type of regime. To them, state power and transnational power do 
not have a steady impact on the type of regime. As they put it, “[Capitalist development] is 
associated with democracy because it transforms the class structure, strengthening the working 
and middle classes and weakening the landed upper class” (7). Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens argue that the contradictory nature of capitalism advanced the cause of democracy and 
analyze the tension and interplay among social classes including the middle class. This kind of in-
depth social class analysis can certainly be applied to the Chinese case.  
In terms of the prominent economic and political conditions that affect the middle class’ 
support for democratization, scholars of this line of research believe that because of the variation 
of these conditions in late-developing countries, the middle class’ support for democratization also 
varies from country to country. According to Chen and Lu (2011), these conditions includes “the 
middle class’ dependence on the state, its perceived socioeconomic well-being, its political 
alliance with other classes (e.g., upper and working class), its own cohesiveness (or fragmentation), 
and its fear of political instability” (706). Numerous studies, especially studies on developing 
country that are experiencing significant economic changes, provide empirical evidence for this 
argument. Examples include Koo’s (1991) study on South Korea, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and 
Stephens’s (1992) study on South Africa, Bertrand’s (1998) study on Southeast Asia, Jones’s 
(1998) study on Pacific Asia, and Englehart’s (2003) study on Thailand. According to these studies, 
when the middle class’ dependence on the authoritarian state is strong, its socioeconomic status is 
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less prominent, its alliance is with the elite, its structure is more fragmented, and its fear of political 
instability is pronounced, the middle class is less likely to support democratization. When these 
conditions change, the middle class in an authoritarian society may also change its attitude toward 
democratization. Given the middle class’ conditional attitude toward democratization, some 
scholar even goes on to say that “it would not make much sense…to characterize [the middle class] 
as progressive or conservative” (Koo 1991: 506). However, born in the process of capitalist 
development, the middle class undeniably shares some intrinsic values with democracy, which is 
also given birth by economic growth. As a result, it makes more sense to perceive the existence of 
certain economic and political conditions as inhibitors of the middle class’ support for democracy.   
A few scholars pay attention to the fragmentation of the middle class and contend that 
because different subgroups of the middle class are not equally positioned in an authoritarian 
system, they may adopt different attitude toward democratization. Koo (1991) mentioned in his 
study that the different segments of the middle class respond to democratic change differently. As 
he specifies, “The transition from authoritarian rule is composed of a series of different ‘moments’ 
or conjunctures, each of which raises different issues, a different form of conflicts, and a shifting 
balance of power among classes” (486). Therefore, different classes in the society respond 
differently, so do the different segments of the middle class. The same observation is made by Gill 
(1998). He suggests that the different strata of the middle class “can have different and sometimes 
conflicting interests and may act in widely divergent ways to protect those interests” (308). As a 
result, as Gontmakher and Ross (2015) put it, “Distinguishing the different groupings which exist 
within the middle class and analyzing their value is thus as important as distinguishing the values 
of different classes” (273).  
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The first perspective of linking modernization, economic development, and the growth of 
the middle class with the middle class’ support for democracy and democratization is optimistic. 
However, it cannot provide a sufficiently convincing explanation for the absence of 
democratization in China and other late-developing, authoritarian countries. The second 
perspective is more sober—and more useful. It can better explain why democratization happened 
or did not happen in countries at different stages of development.  
In developing countries, the middle class has shown various attitudes toward 
democratization. It may support democratization, or it may back authoritarian regimes based on 
specific social, economic, and political contexts. The second perspective is a more effective 
framework to analyze the correlation between the middle class and democratization in developing 
countries such as China. Especially useful in this literature is the emphasis on the fragmentation 
of the middle class. An appreciation for the nuances of the middle class can seemingly help explain 
the potential for democratic change. This study agrees with the view that the middle class plays an 
important role in democratic transformation, but proposes that the Chinese middle class is not 
necessarily prone to democratic change. The Chinese middle class is complex, and it is fragmented. 
Different subgroups of the middle class respond differently to political and economic factors. 
Context is important in Chinese politics. 
 
Studies on the Chinese Middle Class and Democratization 
Many scholars have explored the correlation between the Chinese middle class and potential 
democratization in China. They reach different conclusions on whether the Chinese middle class 
supports democracy or the authoritarian regime. There are two prominent views in this body of 
literature. 
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The first view is that the Chinese middle class, like the Western middle class, embraces 
many liberal values and is in favor of democratic change. However, whether the middle class will 
move to support democratic values is still unclear. Chen and Lu (2006) conducted a representative-
sample survey in Beijing, and the result shows that the Chinese middle class expressed their 
preference for a more democratically organized grassroots self-government—a civic 
administrative unit under the control of the communist party—and their willingness to participate 
in public affairs. Tang, Woods, and Zhao’s (2009) study on the attitudes of Chinese middle class 
is based on the dataset from Asian Barometer Survey. They conclude that China’s middle class 
showed higher democratic orientation than the Chinese lower class when the class is defined by 
occupation or self-identification. As they state, “Compared to farmers, workers, and the 
unemployed, those people who are managers, professionals, private entrepreneurs, or high-salary 
white-color workers show higher affection towards democracy” (90). Specifically speaking, the 
middle class showed stronger civic values, favoring attitude toward democratic political 
procedures, and dislike for unchecked power of the authoritarian regime. They posit that it was the 
new life experience of new professions that increased people’s understanding of modern 
democratic values.  
Tang (2011) examines the characteristics of the rising Chinese middle class by using 
dataset from Asian Barometer Survey. The study shows that in comparison to other social classes, 
the Chinese middle class showed a higher interest in politics and participated more in “personal 
activities in dealing with conflicts with government policies and officials” (373). Nevertheless, the 
middle class as a group did not exhibit any remarkable difference from other classes in political 
activities in confronting the authoritarian state. Therefore, Tang believes that the Chinese middle 
class is not ready to be an active force in the political development in China.  
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The second view is that the Chinese middle class may have adopted certain democratic 
values, but it is, in fact, in favor of the current authoritarian system and fears political instability. 
In her study, Pearson (1997) poses the research question: do economic reforms inevitably lead to 
political change? Her research is based on 51 in-depth interviews conducted in 1991 and 1995 with 
Chinese working in managerial positions in the foreign sector. She argues that China’s emerging 
business elites developed new types of relations with the state, from which a democratic/liberal 
pattern can be observed. She suggests that these business elites enjoyed more autonomy in 
comparison to other social groups. If they fail to convert their economic interests to political 
influence, then other groups are even less likely to be able to do so. Therefore, she believes that 
they were an important social group in deciding China’s political future. Since the relations 
between this group and the state shifted toward clientelism and socialist corporatism, business 
elites did not choose to support the concept of democratization. Therefore, economic reforms and 
the ensuing economic growth did not result in democratization. 
Similar to Pearson’s study, Chen and Dickson’s (2008) study explores the reasons and 
degree of Chinese private entrepreneurs’ support for the existing authoritarian system by 
conducting a survey of private entrepreneurs in five coastal provinces. From the data collected in 
the survey, they contend that Chinese private entrepreneurs have a tendency to support the current 
political system and prefer the status quo to fundamental change. According to the authors, several 
critical factors influenced these private entrepreneurs’ favoring attitude toward the authoritarian 
regime, including “democratic values, life satisfaction, evaluation of government policy 
performance, and perception of official corruption” (780). In addition, they argue that the closer 
the ties that the private entrepreneurs have to the state, the more supportive they are regarding the 
authoritarian regime and the status quo. 
 12 
From a sociological point of view, Tomba (2009) focuses his study on professionals and 
public employees in China. He argues that the significant economic status enhancement happened 
in the late 1990s for salaried Chinese professionals and public employees was not because of the 
market or the growing economy. He contends that their elevated status was engineered by the 
reformist state to boost consumer spending, simulate economic growth, promote social and 
political stability, and enhance the efficiency of the bureaucracy. As the “winner” picked by the 
state, these professionals and public employees received raised salaries and improved working 
conditions, and they benefited from redistribution of public assets, especially of housing. These 
policies favored social groups in the urban areas that have close ties to the state. Apart from the 
economic consideration of the state, Tomba points out, creating a middle class—an exemplary 
class—can also help the state to maintain its legitimacy and authority. The middle class’ interests 
are intertwined with the state interests, and its privileged status increases its fear of political 
instability and the lower class. As a result, the Chinese middle class is more of a force for social 
stability than an agent of political change. 
In the same vein, Chen and Lu (2011) base their research on data collected from their 
probability-sample survey conducted on urban population in three cities. They analyze respondents’ 
rights consciousness, valuation of political liberty versus order, support for participatory norm, 
and support for competitive election. They conclude that the Chinese middle class’ support for 
democratization in authoritarian countries is contingent on many social, economic, and political 
conditions. They also contend that the more the Chinese middle class depends on the state, the less 
it would support democratization. In addition, when the middle class perceive a good prospect in 
the authoritarian country, it would tend to be less supportive of democratization.  
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Based on empirical evidence from previous studies, Nathan’s (2016) study explore the 
reason why Lipset’s modernization cannot explain the current situation in China and why the 
Chinese middle class is not yet a supportive force for democratization. He argues that there are 
four differences between the Chinese middle class and Lipset’s middle class. First, the Chinese 
middle class only accounts for a small percentage of the population. Second, the Chinese middle 
class has a different nature of employment, and those in the middle class are mostly employees of 
state-controlled organizations. Third, the Chinese middle class is new. It only reemerged four 
decades ago and began its rapid growth three decades ago. The Chinese middle class only started 
to forge a way of life and have little shared perceptions or interests. Nathan explains, “For an 
established middle class, wealth is a spur to political participation; for a new middle class, political 
participation is a distraction” (11). Fourth, the Chinese middle class does not have a rich 
associational life common in the Western middle class. The government forbids organizations that 
may compete with top-down youth, women’s, and labor associations, and it also impedes the 
growth of independent media and heavily regulate the internet. Though having some features 
related to support for democratization, the Chinese middle class today, Nathan believes, has too 
many fears, and that is why while it has more democratic values, it still supports an authoritarian 
state.  
Both views of the Chinese middle class and democratization are supported by certain 
empirical evidence from the aforementioned studies. However, these empirical studies have their 
limits and cannot be deemed as definitive because most of them are based on a sample that has 
limited representation. Nevertheless, these studies shed light on the puzzle of why China is not 
democratized when there are remarkable economic development and a fast-growing middle class. 
Although whether the Chinese middle class supports democracy or the authoritarian state is 
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debatable, several other points are clear. As a social class born in the tide of economic reform and 
benefitting from modernization and economic growth, the Chinese middle class is prone to 
democratic/liberal values. Some social groupings within the middle class are dependent on the 
state, benefiting from the status quo, but the middle class as a whole is subject to the rule of the 
authoritarian state and under its control. The middle class’ wealth and social status can be easily 
affected by the authoritarian state’s policies, and its liberal values are limited by the non-
democratic reality and fear.  
Drawing on these conclusions, this study will further explain the absence of 
democratization in China and specify the Chinese middle class’ stance on democratic change. 
Based on empirical evidence from multiple sources, the study will distinguish different subgroups 
of the Chinese middle class, analyze their various relations with the authoritarian state, the benefit 
and/or punishment that they may receive from the state, and the tensions among themselves. The 
study explains how the different interests of these subgroups and their different relations with the 
state hinder the middle class as a whole from achieving consensus and creating a momentum for 
democratic change. The study will also discuss why the attitude of subgroups that are dependent 




II. THE CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS EXPLAINED 
 
The Formation of the Chinese Middle Class  
The Chinese society experienced a period of instability after the end of Qing Dynasty in 1912. 
Between the late 1920s and 1930s, some military-related industrial sectors were developed in 
preparation for war with Japan. Moreover, in the Republican era (1912–1949), according to Chow 
(2007), “In spite of political instability, economic activities carried on and economic development 
took place between 1911 and 1937,” and he concludes, “modernization was taking place” (20–21). 
During this period, China had a well-functioning market economy, which laid foundation for 
China’s return to a market economy after its economic reform in the late 1970s. The growth of 
national capitalism gave birth to factories and workers in major cities, and thus, the Chinese society 
underwent some significant structural changes.  
Chen (2013) distinguished two sectors in the pre-1949 Chinese society: an urban sector 
and a rural sector. In the rural sector, there was “the dominance of a small number of gentry and 
landowners over the large number of landless peasants” (46). In the urban sector, there was “the 
dominance of a small number of upper-class bourgeoisie and comprador capitalists over a large 
number of urban proletariat” (46). In Mao Zedong’s (1977) well-known essay “Analysis of the 
Classes in Chinese Society,” he also discusses different components of the 1920s’ Chinese society 
and distinguishes five classes, some of which can be further divided into subgroups. These classes 
were: (1) the landlord class and the comprador class, (2) the middle bourgeoisie, (3) the petty 
bourgeoisie, (4) the semi-proletariat, and (5) the proletariat. According to Mao, the petty 
bourgeoisie class included the owner-peasants, the master handicraftsmen, and the lower levels of 
the intellectuals, to be specific, students, primary and secondary school teachers, lower 
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government functionaries, office clerks, small lawyers, and petty traders. This category clearly 
paints a picture of the early Chinese middle class. Based on previous studies, Chen estimates that 
the early Chinese middle class accounted for about only three percent of the population right before 
1949. Despite of its small size, this gradually rising class had certain degree of economic and 
political independence and forged a life style of their own.   
In 1949, China ended its civil war with the retreat of the Republic of China to Taiwan and 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. The new communist government, under the 
guidance of the orthodox Marxist ideology, had a mission of eliminating class differences and 
creating “a classless and equal society” (Chen 2013: 47). Therefore, soon after the party took 
power, it pushed through reforms to eradicate the economic foundations for private economy in 
order to achieve the destratification of social classes. In the land reform in the rural China, the 
party confiscated wealth and land from landlords and redistributed them to peasants.  
In urban China, in the 1950s, the party nationalized all large enterprises owned by national 
and comprador capitalists, most of which later evolved into state-owned enterprises. To take over 
ownership of these enterprises, “the communist state paid capitalists a fixed interest on their capital 
until 1966” (Riskin 1991:97). In the same period, the state started “a program of collectivization 
of the industrial and commercial enterprises owned by the petite bourgeoisie—the so-called 
handicraft industrialists” (Chen 2013: 47). After these reforms, there was no private economy in 
China, and almost none of the Chinese people owned private assets. By 1958, the Chinese society 
had become almost entirely free of economic basis for class differentiation, and the party-state 
took full control over the Chinese economy. All urban citizens were assigned to different types of 
work units and had very little occupational mobility. No group of people in China could be 
construed as the middle class.  
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Under Mao’s class struggle theory, most former capitalists and petty bourgeoisie were 
categorized as members of the reactionary class and systematically persecuted. Their offspring 
was also included in the same category based on the concept of class origin (Young 1986: 43). In 
1966, the party started the Cultural Revolution after Mao claimed that the bourgeoisie had 
infiltrated the government and society in the attempt to restore capitalism. During this chaotic 
period, former capitalists, business owners, professionals and white-collar employees, and 
intellectuals were significantly purged. Most of them suffered brutal “struggle sessions,” and some 
of them ended up in prison (Chen 2002: 30–31).  
About a decade of political chaos and the zigzags in economic policy during the Cultural 
Revolution period resulted in slow economic growth. In 1978, China entered its economic reform 
era and started implementing the open-door policy. In this era, the Chinese society experienced a 
dramatic change in social stratification. As Chen (2013) states, “While Maoist China was 
characterized by the social ‘destratification,’ post-Mao China has seen the gradual return of the 
pre-1949 social stratification” (50). Most of the change happened through policies that encouraged 
economic privatization. In the early period of economic reform (1978–1983), the party gradually 
legitimized the existence of the private sector and allowed individual/small-scale business to be a 
supplement to the state and collective sectors. Only in the next stage of reform (1984–1992), the 
state started to recognize the legitimacy of private enterprises, which had more employees than 
individual/small-scale business. In the ensuing period (1993–present), the state deepened the 
reform by taking economic privatization to the next level. After the 1989 pro-democratic 
movement, Deng Xiaoping made the decision to continue economic reform and make the transition 
to a market-based economy. After Deng’s famous southern tour in 1992, China’s private economy 
started to grow at an exponential speed. In 1995, the party carried out its reform of state-owned 
 18 
enterprises and implemented a policy— “keep the large ones and let the smaller ones go.” As a 
result of this policy, most small- and medium-scale state-owned enterprises were privatized and 
became a part of the private sector (Dittmer and Gore 2001). At the same time, the party 
encouraged party cadres and government officials to participate in the activities of the private 
economy, and by the mid-1990s, “they had become the largest group among private entrepreneurs” 
(Chen 2013: 52). In the ensuing decades, the successors of Deng Xiaoping kept following the 
reform plan laid out by Deng, and China’s economy made unprecedented progress. In 2017, there 
were 65.79 million individually owned businesses and 27.26 million private enterprises in China. 
In 2018, the private sector contributed more than 60 percent of China’s GDP growth and created 
more than half of its fiscal revenue. In the same year, China’s private economy provided more than 
80 percent of jobs and created over 70 percent of technological innovation and new products in 
the country (Xinhuanet 2018). 
To be noted, the communist party adopted a capitalist economic reform approach because 
of the consideration that such an approach is more economically efficient than the old system. It 
was political pragmatism, not a fundamental change in ideology. By taking this approach, the 
communist party maintained its legitimacy by creating remarkable economic growth. Moreover, 
the ruling elite drew lessons from the collapse of the Soviet Union, prioritized economic reform, 
and left the political reform behind. It was against this backdrop, after two decades of absence, the 
Chinese middle class reemerged. 
 
Defining the Contemporary Chinese Middle Class 
According to Chen and Lu (2006), there are two approaches in the political science literature in 
terms of the conceptualization of the middle class, “subjective approach” and “objective approach” 
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(2). The subjective approach deems social class as an individual’s perception of the stratum in the 
society that this individual belongs. It is a psychological attachment to a social class, which 
influences an individual’s attitude toward politics. The objective approach is defining social class 
by certain objective socioeconomic indicators, such as income, education, and occupation. The 
objective approach bifurcates into two branches. One branch quantifies those objective indicators. 
For example, the quantitative branch puts emphasis on the range of the income of a social class 
instead of the sources of income. The other branch is a qualitative branch. It stresses the qualitative 
property of the objective indicators, such as different types of occupations. 
As an emerging social class in China, the middle class has been expanding since its 
reappearance four decades ago, but it is a relatively new and evolving class. People may have 
limited understanding of the middle class or even misperception of it. Therefore, people may not 
have a shared opinion on what the middle class indicates. As a result, this study takes the objective 
approach to defining the Chinese middle class. Both quantitative and qualitative branches are 
applied to defining the Chinese middle class in this study. While defining the Chinese middle class 
by income level is objective and practical, it alone may fail to acknowledge some particular 
features of the Chinese politics and economy. First, there are significant differences between the 
urban China and the rural China due to the dualistic development of the country. Apart from 
different income and education levels, the urban China and rural China are positioned differently 
in the prominent dual economic structure (Xu, Shi and Huang 2014). In the economic reform 
period, the party also applied different policies to the urban and rural China. Consequently, the 
reemerged Chinese middle-class citizens are mostly the product of urban economy and evolved 
during industrialization and modernization in the urban areas. Since there is no significant 
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geographic difference in economic and social development among urban areas, this study does not 
distinguish middle-class subgroups based on different geographic locations in urban China. 
Second, it is necessary to distinguish the various sources of income based on different 
occupations because income level alone is not an enough indicator of how an individual is 
positioned in a society. In fact, many previous studies on the Chinese middle class have paid 
attention to the sources of the middle class’ class status. According to Li (2010), there are three 
channels through which individuals can access middle class status: “‘power-based executive 
access,’ which includes members of the ruling party, government officials and members of the 
civil service; ‘market-driven access,’ which includes private entrepreneurs and managers; and 
‘social network access,’ which include professionals and cultural elites” (18). As an effective 
indicator of sources of income, occupation can reveal “[social] groupings that are distinct and 
separate from one another” (Oppenheimer 1985: 7). Thus, when defining the Chinese middle class, 
apart from income level, this study also takes geographic location and occupation into 
consideration.  
Thus, based on the statistics from a report by Mckinsey & Company, the Chinese middle 
class is defined as urban Chinese citizens whose annual incomes range from $13,500 to $53,900 
(Barton, Chen, and Jin 2010), and whose family income source is mainly from such occupations 
as government officials and party cadres, private entrepreneurs of small or medium business, 
professionals, and white-collar employees. There are different sources of data on the Chinese 
middle class. Although they may be based on different definitions of the social class, it is helpful 
for achieving a more specific understanding of the Chinese middle class to draw the contours of it 
with some statistics. The Chinese middle class has an estimated size of 400 million people or 140 
million households, which accounts for about one-third of China’s population. Only 4 percent of 
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the Chinese urban population was considered middle class in 2000, but the number increased to 
more than 30 percent in 2018 (Cyrill 2019). By 2022, 76 percent of the Chinese urban population 
will be considered middle class (Barton, Chen, and Jin 2010), and about 100 million Chinese 
households will reach an above-upper-middle-class living standard (36Kr 2017).  
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III. A FRAGMENTED CHINESE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE ABSENCE OF 
DEMOCRACY  
 
A Chinese Middle Class without Consensus 
After four decades of economic and social development, the Chinese middle class has grown to be 
a prominent social group in the today’s Chinese society. Along with other social groups, the 
Chinese middle class has experienced rising wealth and education, more access to information, 
improved physical mobility, freer lifestyle choices, and other personal freedoms. Many scholars 
have commented on this gradual liberalization (Pearson 1997; Chen and Lu 2006; Tang, Woods 
and Zhao 2009; Tang 2011; Nathan 2016). However, these remarkable changes did not lead to a 
middle class with pronounced pro-democratic support, let alone a middle class acting as a driving 
force of democratization.  
There are multiple reasons for the political inactivity of the Chinese middle class. It can be 
explained by its newness because it may take time for the middle class to find their voice (Nathan 
2016). However, in the Chinese case, the middle class’ dependence on the state and its preference 
for the status quo are deeper reasons for its lack of democratic support. After all, in the 
authoritarian country, the state controls the necessities for economic development, such as 
resources and finance, and many members of the middle class have strong ties with the state. In 
addition, this dependence is enhanced by the state’s cooptation strategy toward the middle class 
(Tang 2011: 375). Moreover, the middle class benefits from the status quo and does not want to 
lose its advantageous position by supporting unpredictable political changes. When discussing the 
middle class as a homogeneous social group, the above reasons for an inactive middle class are 
feasible. Nevertheless, they cannot explain why there is empirical evidence that shows the Chinese 
middle class’ expression of favor toward democratic procedures and dislike for unchecked power 
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of the authoritarian state (Chen and Lu 2006; Tang, Woods and Zhao 2009; Tang 2011; Pearson 
1997). The schizophrenic expression of the middle class’ attitude toward democratization is a 
manifestation of its fragmentation and the tension among different subgroups. The Chinese middle 
class may have the potential for supporting democratization, but it does not have the cohesion to 
reach a consensus. 
To explain how the fragmentation of the Chinese middle class prevents it from forming a 
consensus on democratization, this part of the study analyzes the fragmented Chinese middle class 
by delving into each middle-class subgroup’s state of existence, including their sources of wealth, 
relations with the state, relations with other subgroups, and their preferences and fears. 
Subsequently, there is a discussion of how the state handles these subgroups, and the middle class 
as a whole. Finally, this part of the study explores when democratization might be a favorable 
choice for the Chinese middle class by examining the middle class’ attitude in the China of 1989 
and the China of 2019. 
 
1. Government Officials and Party Cadres  
Government officials and party cadres account for a significant part of the Chinese middle class. 
In one study conducted in three large cities in China, this subgroup makes up 60 percent of middle-
class respondents (Nathan 2016: 10). Since they have the strongest tie with the party-state and 
directly ensure the survival of the authoritarian regime, government officials and party cadres 
usually receive generous remuneration from the state. This compensation is especially true after 
the second half of 1990s, when the state decided to build a more efficient government by emulating 
Singapore and Hong Kong, and adopting a policy of “paying a high salary to foster honesty” 
(Tomba 2009: 4). Millions of public servants benefitted from this salary boost, with some even 
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received four times of what they used to earn. Apart from high salary, government officials and 
party cadres also get special access to inexpensive housing and low-price, high-quality healthcare, 
and it is common for them to regularly receive free food, free transport, and other perks (Huanqiu 
2012; Jiang 2013).  
In addition to these benefits, party officials and party cadres may also get their wealth from 
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Pei (2006) argues that as a neo-Leninist state, China 
“blends one-party rule and state control of key sectors of the economy with partial market reforms” 
(34). After four decades of development, the state is still deeply entrenched in the economy. 
According to government data, in 2008, SOEs held about 30 percent of total assets in the industrial 
and service sectors (Xu 2010). The authoritarian state cannot maintain power through coercion 
alone. As a result, these firms then serve as “a vast patronage system that secures the loyalty of 
supporters and allocates privileges to favored groups” (Pei 2006: 35). In these SOEs, most of the 
chief and senior executives are appointed by the party, and members of the party committees in 
these enterprises are also members of the boards of directors. Lower-ranking managers and some 
staff members of these firms also have dual identities (Cheng 2004: 10). Good performance of 
SOEs is favored, but the executives from the party have no mandatory responsibilities to ensure 
the efficiency of these enterprises. Corporate debts and bad loans are usually absorbed by the state, 
which pays for the debts by using revenue generated by extracting high taxes from private 
businesses and Chinese citizens. Employees and the management in SOEs also enjoy high salary 
and benefits. Moreover, during the 1995 privatization of SOEs, most small- and medium-scale 
SOEs were cheaply sold to the managers of SOEs and became their “first pot of gold” as private 
business owners. Apart from these sources of wealth, government officials and SOE managers also 
receive the so-called “grey income.” They “often take advantage of their positions to approve 
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projects, set prices or influence other deals and then to reap ‘grey income’ in bribes, backhanders 
and other forms of corruption” (South China Morning Post 2010), and when the misdeeds are 
discovered, some of them only receive “light punishments” (Gidda 2016). 
In comparison to other subgroups in the Chinese middle class, government officials and 
party cadres enjoy high stability of employment. Since China started embracing market economy, 
employment with the state has become the most sought-after “iron rice bowl” to Chinese citizens 
because it usually means a job for life with numerous benefits. As a result, young Chinese citizens 
favor these jobs because of the job security, competitive salary, and fringe benefits. To obtain these 
jobs, people usually need to join the communist party (Nathan 2016: 10). In 2018, 920,000 people 
took the national civil service exam, and on average, 63 job applicants competed for one post (Ni 
2018).  
In the competition for better social status, all contenders are not equal. The offspring of 
government officials and party cadres are situated in an advantageous position. They occupied 
positions in the government and the military, enjoying political power, and then went into business, 
benefitting greatly from the post-Mao market economy because of their strong ties with the state 
(Pei 2016: 36). By using their nepotistic connections, the second and even third red generations 
can obtain positions “inside the system,” and then they are “riding a rocket” and “promoted rapidly 
through government or party ranks to fill positions that, usually, have been vacated by their parents” 
(Wang 2013). When the country transformed itself from a planned economy to a market-based 
economy, these resourceful offspring used their families’ influence to “buy goods at government-
fixed prices and resell them at the higher market prices” (Wang 2013). Their profiteering caused 
public discontent that triggered the 1989 pro-democratic movement. Years later, when China’s 
SOEs started to enter the stock market in Hong Kong, these well-connected offspring “landed 
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positions at American and European banks where they used their parents’ influence to seek listing 
mandates” (Wang 2013). 
Clearly, as the major beneficiary of the current authoritarian system, the subgroup of 
government officials and party cadres obtained their wealth by using or being close to the public 
power. They also have a great advantage in “class regeneration.” Moreover, their privileges and 
clientelistic ties with private entrepreneurs create tensions between them and rest of the society. 
They have the least motivation in supporting democratization and changing the status quo. Still, 
as individuals, they may be influenced by liberal or democratic values. Furthermore, the political 
infighting and possible political terror of the authoritarian bureaucratic system may also result in 
their support for a more democratic system. For example, the downfall of Bo Xilai and his allies 
might remind these government officials and party cadres of the precariousness of politics in an 
authoritarian state. 
 
2. Private Entrepreneurs of Small or Medium Businesses 
The private sector of the Chinese economy and private entrepreneurs are born in the process of 
economic reform led by the state and benefit from the state’s economic policies. After decades of 
development, private entrepreneurs have become an indispensable part of the Chinese economy, 
contributed greatly toward the country’s high-speed economic growth, and become an important 
part of the Chinese middle class. 
This part of the middle class has complicated ties with the party-state. Chen and Dickson 
(2008) discuss the party-state’s political embeddedness in the private sector, and they examine 
private entrepreneurs’ different degrees of affiliation to the party-state. The scholars distinguish 
two groups of private entrepreneurs that have close ties with the state. The first group is private 
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entrepreneurs who are party members. This groups includes “formerly party and government 
officials, state-owned enterprise (SOE) managers, or rank and file members” (788). The second 
group is private entrepreneurs who are members of the All-China Federation of Industry and 
Commerce (ACFIC), which is a state sponsored association. The state regards this association as 
the important institutional connection with private entrepreneurs. In the 1990s, the relations 
between private entrepreneurs and the state gradually shifted to clientelism, and thus, private 
entrepreneurs became more dependent on the state (Pearson 1997). There are still independent 
private entrepreneurs, but they only account for a small portion of this subgroup of the middle 
class. Just as dependent private entrepreneurs, these independent private entrepreneurs also have 
to develop close ties with officials of the party-state to do business.  
In the face of a rising class of private entrepreneurs, the state has taken steps to coopt this 
new force in the Chinese society and prevent it from turning into a threat to the authoritarian system. 
The party-state adopted two strategies (Dickson 2003): “building institutional linkages with 
business associations and recruiting entrepreneurs into the party” (Obukhova 2004: 901). In 2001, 
the party started to allow private entrepreneurs to join the party, and it also encouraged private 
entrepreneurs to participate in civic and political affairs, including “community contribution, 
participation in local people’s congresses, political consultative conferences, and local elections” 
(Obukhova 2004: 902). Being coopted into the party-state and enjoying more benefits, the attitude 
of these private entrepreneurs, “especially regarding their willingness to restrict political 
participation to elites and to follow the lead of the state in political and especially economic reform,” 
became “more in common with the neoconservative perspective prominent in some intellectual 
circles in China than a liberal faith in participatory democracy” (Dickson 2003: 134). Moreover, 
in 2004, the party-state amended the Chinese constitution and provided for the protection of private 
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property. According to Article 13 of the amended constitution, citizen’s lawful private property is 
“inviolable” (Zhang 2015).  
Though being coopted by the party-state, the middle-class subgroup of private 
entrepreneurs still faces a difficult business environment. The challenge is twofold. First, private 
entrepreneurs have to pay the price for political corruption when dealing with the clientelistic ties 
between them and government and party officials. Everything from the registration of a company 
to the sale of commodities requires governmental approval. However, the approval or disapproval 
of a business activity is not entirely based on laws and regulations, and there is room for rent-
seeking local officials to ask for bribes (Chen 2002: 415). As a result, small- and medium-scale 
business owners share the same resentment against corruption with the subgroups of the middle 
class that have no party or governmental background. Second, these private entrepreneurs need to 
face the competition with red capitalists and SOEs. Without strong ties to the state like most 
business elites have, these small- and medium-scale private entrepreneurs feel vulnerable in the 
party-state-controlled market. Therefore, they support the idea of “institutionalization of and 
ideological (or constitutional) justification for capitalism in order to make their business and 
capitalist way of life politically safe” and “a system of checks and balances that could effectively 
constrain party power over the market” (Chen 2002: 416). What they demand clearly resonates 
with democratic values.  
The interests of the private entrepreneurs are not aligned with those of the lower part of the 
middle class, namely, white-collar employees, and the lower class in the Chinese society—workers 
and farmers. Benefitting from the clientelistic ties with the government officials, private 
entrepreneurs are able to maximize business profit with the help of a labor-repressive state power. 
When exploitation and deteriorating working conditions cause capital-labor tensions, local 
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governments usually choose to side with private entrepreneurs, share their profit, and ignore the 
rights of the employees, who are underpaid or forced to work overtime (Chen 2002). 
High income inequality in Chinese society also worries private entrepreneurs because it 
may trigger a political movement or unpredictable change. The fear of revolution is deeply 
engrained in these private entrepreneurs, and thus, they have reasons to back the authoritarian state 
and prevent disruptive political change. However, most of these private entrepreneurs “have not 
freed themselves from suspicions about the communist leadership’s commitment to capitalism” 
(Chen 2002: 415). They still need the democratic rule of law and confined state power to prevent 
the recurrence of what happened to their predecessors in the 1950s.  
 
3. Professionals 
The middle-class subgroup of professionals includes professionals in both public sector and private 
sector of the economy. Most professionals in the public sector are dependent on the state for their 
income. As highly educated people, professionals are more prone to democratic values, and, as a 
result, they are usually supervised by the state through their affiliated public agencies—such as 
universities, public hospitals, research institutions, or trade associations—such as the China 
Writers Association and the All China Lawyers Association.  
The state makes efforts to coopt professionals, especially professionals in the public sector. 
While professionals in the private sector obtain wealth in the market-based economy, those in the 
public sector mainly depend on government commission and experienced a surge of income in the 
late 1990s. For example, the salaries of professionals in the healthcare sector in Beijing raised by 
168 percent during 1995 and 2000, and their average salary increased on average to 40 percent 
above the average salary. In the same time period, professionals in tertiary education and scientific 
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institutions experienced an increase in salary by 158 percent, and their average salary went from 
below average to 31 percent above the average salary (Tomba 2009: 3). Apart from expanded 
income, professionals in the public sector also received other benefits, including education, welfare, 
and housing. Moreover, the state also hands out a special government stipend, and recruits 
professionals into the party or promotes them to senior government positions.  
Professionals’ experience of upward economic mobility is accompanied by an elevated 
social status. In traditional Chinese society, intellectuals were venerated by the public. However, 
in the chaotic Mao era, intellectuals were seen as members of “class enemies” and “bourgeois 
reactionaries,” named the “Stinking Ninth” 1  (Facts and Details 2019), and systematically 
persecuted. During the first two decades of economic reform era, when the economy took off, 
these professionals’ income was left behind, and they were seen as “perennial under-achievers.” 
The sudden economic elevation helped professionals to assume a much higher social status. These 
uplifting changes, along with other perks due to the state’s cooptation strategy, successfully tamed 
politically most of these professionals. Those professionals who cannot be coopted were purged. 
For example, according to the regulations of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Academy 
scholars “must adhere to the guiding role of Marxism in philosophical and social science research, 
and may not publicly proclaim views which oppose or violate the fundamental theory, direction, 
or platform of the Party.” Scholars who violated the regulation were dismissed from their positions 
(Human Rights in China 2009).  
Thus, the middle-class subgroup of professionals, which is usually the “forces of 
democratization,” is neutralized by state’s cooptation and purges. Some of the professionals may 
                                                        
1 Mao Zedong distinguishes nine categories of enemies during the Cultural Revolution, including landlords, rich 
peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, traitor, foreign agents, capitalist roaders, and intellectuals. 
The name comes from intellectuals’ ninth ranking on the list (Facts and Details 2019). 
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strive for democratic political change, but most of them are satisfied with the benefits that they 
obtain from the authoritarian status quo and have learned from past political movements and recent 
“lessons” to live under the rule of the party.  
 
4. White-Collar Employees 
White-collar employees are the lower part of the Chinese middle class. This subgroup of the 
Chinese middle class grew rapidly along with the expansion of the private sector in the 1990s. 
White-collar employees are mostly college educated and were once an exemplary group of the 
Chinese middle class in the 1990s and early 2000s, representing the China’s version of the “middle 
class dream” (Chan 2010). A college degree used to be a ticket to middle-class status. However, 
after the expansion of university enrollment in 1996, there was a massive glut of college graduates. 
An excessive supply of college graduates, the aftereffects of the global financial crisis, and the 
slowdown of the Chinese economy all negatively affect the employment prospect of these white-
collar employees. They are forced to take jobs with a lower salary. Some of these white-collar 
employees are struggling on the edge of being middle class, and others have already stepped down 
from the middle-class status, earning less than blue-collar employees (Chan 2010). 
The middle-class subgroup of white-collar employees is facing multiple challenges. Rising 
property prices, poor salaries, limited promotion opportunities, and poor health conditions due to 
heavy workload are among reasons for their anxiety (Wang 2017). According to a Cision report 
(2018), about 45.1 percent of white-collar employees rented apartments, and 22.2 percent of them 
bought condominiums with mortgages. About 70 percent of white-collar employees were not 
satisfied with their salaries and believed that their current salaries did not match their skills. More 
than 90 percent of white-collar employees experienced anxiety often or occasionally.  
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Moreover, as the lower part of the middle class, white-collar employees do not enjoy 
privileges available to other subgroups, and their rights are also not properly protected by the state, 
which creates tensions between white-collar employees and other subgroups of the middle and 
upper class. The most telling example is the infamous “996” work schedule. In recent years, more 
companies in China started to expect white-collar employees to work “from nine in the morning 
to nine in the evening, six days a week” (Hruby 2018). Those employees who opposed the 12-hour 
workaday were dismissed by companies. Making employees work overtime is against the labor 
law in China, but private businesses were not punished by law because of the acquiescence of the 
state. In terms of the “996” work schedule, the response from government officials was that 
companies should have employees’ consent for working overtime, and that if employees believe 
companies’ work schedules are against the law, they have the right to file a complaint (Zhao 2019). 
However, in reality, filing a complaint against the company means certain dismissal. White-collar 
employees can rarely afford the cost.  
Facing deteriorating job market, financial burdens, and exploitation by private 
entrepreneurs, the middle-class subgroup of white-collar employees have enough reason for 
supporting a more democratic system that can effectively protect their rights and well-being. With 
their education background, these white-collar employees are tech-savvy, speak foreign languages, 
and thus, are more likely to embrace democratic values. In addition, they are also familiar with the 
internet and social media. As a result, they can pose a threat to the authoritarian rule of the party 
if they are organized around a common cause. 
Based on the above analysis of different subgroups of the Chinese middle class, it is clear 
that these various subgroups have different interests that create divisions and tensions. Therefore, 
although these subgroups all share certain degree of democratic orientation, the fragmented 
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structure of the Chinese middle class prevents reaching a consensus on democratic change. The 
more privileged subgroups, such as government officials and party cadres and some private 
entrepreneurs and professionals, are benefitting from the current order and remain satisfied with 
the authoritarian status quo. The lower part of the middle class can only cope with the tensions 
between themselves and privileged subgroups. There is little common ground for joining forces 
and reaching a political consensus. The fragmented Chinese middle class is also the product of the 
party-state’s cooptation.  
With no cohesion in the class structure, the Chinese middle class is not likely, for the time 
being, to become a force of democratic change. Furthermore, the more privileged subgroups that 
are more dependent on the state are the ones with more social influence and resources. As a result, 
their attitude toward a potential democratic change is crucial to the formation of a middle-class 
consensus. If the lower part of the middle class could receive support from the more privileged 
part of the middle class, a consensus on democratization might be reached, and a democratic 
change could be possible. 
To prevent such a consensus from being reached, the state handles the Chinese middle class 
through ways more than cooptation. First, the state tightens its social surveillance and control over 
media. Economic development has equipped the state with the revenue to fund “expanded and 
upgraded police efforts (including monitoring and censorship of the internet)” (Pei 2007: 55). 
Moreover, the state also introduces a “social credit” system, which not only records citizens’ 
financial credit but also documents their “good deeds” and puts some citizens on a “blacklist” 
based on their misconduct. The citizens’ social credit score can directly affect their financial and 
employment opportunities, and it is also linked to their access to public service (Zeng 2018). This 
measure can be used to punish citizens who do not cooperate with the state. Second, the state uses 
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its propaganda machine to discredit democracy as a feasible political system for China. The state 
promotes media coverage of democratic movements in other countries, which are portraited as 
chaotic and dangerous, so that the Chinese middle class and other parts of the society “associate 
democracy with political chaos, economic breakdown, the mafia, and other social evils” (Chen 
2002: 414). And last, when propaganda and surveillance are not effective, the state can resort to 
political retribution to deter any challenge posed by middle-class individual. For example, to 
protect their rights, members of the middle class are more likely to choose a legal solution. 
However, by suing government officials, these individuals might face “inconvenience or trouble 
in their future relationship with the government” (Tang 2011: 384). More progressive actions such 
as protesting can be framed as “subversion” and then be repressed.  
Under the pressure of state control, the middle class’ voice is muffled, and an alliance 
among different subgroups is elusive because the censored media cannot provide a forum for these 
groups. Consequently, the gaps between these fragmented middle-class subgroups has deepened. 
The party-state’s unconstrained power can negatively affect the interests of the middle class as a 
whole, privileged and unprivileged members alike. With its lack of confidence in the state and the 
future of the country, and even fear of the possible collapse of China, many middle class members, 
along with some members of the upper class, have left the country. They seek to migrate to more 
developed democratic countries, such as the United State, Canada, the European Union, Australia, 
and New Zealand (Sohu 2018), where they believe their private property will be protected. This 
trend caused capital outflows that concern the state because of their negative impact on the Chinese 
economy. Some government officials even became so-called “naked officials,” those who “send 
their families overseas allegedly with their ill-gotten assets” (Li 2014).  
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When Is Democracy Preferred? 
If the argument in this study holds, then the Chinese middle class does have an intrinsic desire and 
need for a more democratic political system. However, it has not been able to act because of the 
fragmentation of the class and the deep tensions among its subgroups. The strategic handling of 
the middle class by the party-state only deepens the fragmentation. At this point, there is a question 
that needs to be asked: when will democratization become the preferred future for the Chinese 
middle class as a whole? By taking a look at the China of 1989 and the China of 2019, and 
analyzing the political, economic, and social conditions in these two eras, the answer is clear: the 
various Chinese middle-class subgroups need to somehow form a cohesive force around a common 
cause, and the subgroups of the middle class dependent on the state need to support the potential 
democratic change. 
A pro-democratic movement happened in the China of 1989. In the 1989 Chinese society, 
the social groups that can be construed as middle class were government officials and party cadres, 
professionals, and small-scale businesspeople. At that time, the salaries of government officials, 
party cadres, and professionals were not significantly higher than other urban social groups. 
Income inequality among the Chinese middle class was not pronounced. Moreover, the economic 
reform was still at its initial stage, and thus the tensions between owners of private business and 
their employees were not marked. In the 1980s, there was a liberalization in the Chinese urban 
society, and intellectuals and urban citizens were both exposed to some democratic values. 
Furthermore, after ten years of political terror during the Cultural Revolution, the party 
implemented a more relaxed political attitude. As a result, when the resentment toward the 
profiteering of the offspring of government and party officials fermented in the Chinese society 
and was expressed by the university students—a considerable amount of which were from middle 
 36 
class families, the middle class supported the movement. In Beijing, many urban citizens joined 
the student protest and provided food and transportation for students. But the repression of the 
state was fast and furious. 
There are many possible reasons for the failure of the 1989 pro-democratic movement. 
Some scholars believe that the university students failed to engage workers and farmers to form 
an alliance; some argue that the students wanted to be coopted by the state and were not determined 
to support democracy; and still other contend that the reason might be the lack of a Chinese civil 
society or the party’s determination to suppress dissent.  
This study contends that one other reason might be the fear of instability of the middle 
class as a whole. After a decade of devastating political movement, the Chinese middle class only 
had a brief taste of economic development and a relatively peaceful political life. Although most 
of them hoped for democratic change, their memory of the past horror was still fresh. They were 
not ready for a political upheaval that could possibly send the country back to chaos. Therefore, 
their support for democracy was halting, tentative, and weak. 
In the China of 2019, there no national democratic movement in spite of high income 
inequality, rampant corruption, economic slowdown, many social grievances, and a tightening 
political control of the party. The economic development and the party’s cooptation strategy both 
deepen the fragmentation of the Chinese middle class, and it is difficult for various subgroups of 
the middle class to reach a consensus on democratization because they have different interests and 





After four decades of economic and social development, Chinese society has undergone significant 
changes, and the Chinese, including the middle class, have grown with the country as they have 
lived through different stages of economic development. The absence of democracy in today’s 
China is more than just a puzzle, but, in fact, an embodiment of the contradictory nature of the 
country: a fasting-growing middle class, benefitting both from the capitalist economy and the 
authoritarian political system, but composed of fragmented subgroups, all harboring nervousness 
about politics. Division stymies political engagement. Only when a consensus among the many 
middle-class subgroups is achieved will there be a possibility for a democratic China. 
Certain scenarios could lead to a middle-class consensus. First, China’s immense income 
inequality could lead the lower part of the middle class to protest. The privileged part of the 
Chinese society, including the upper part of the middle class, might be forced into a consensus 
because of the lower middle class’ large size and its strong ties with rural China (a significant 
number of white-collar employees are from rural families). Second, unexpected events, such as a 
natural disaster or a catastrophic accident, might exposed the party-state’s weaknesses and 
potentially threaten the interests of the privileged subgroups of the middle class. Then a middle-
class consensus might be reached. Finally, the mishandling of the middle class by the party might 
lead to a middle-class consensus. For example, the party’s austerity program might hurt the 
interests and undermine the loyalty of the privileged subgroups of the middle class, leading them 
to form a coalition with less fortunate members of the middle class. 
In the globalized era, the well-to-do Chinese middle class could choose in increasingly 
large numbers to leave authoritarian China and to migrate to democratic countries. Migration can 
be perceived as an individual solution to a collective problem. By escaping from the authoritarian 
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system, middle-class individuals can finally embrace the democratic values and rights that they 
desire. For the state, migration is a safety valve. Despite the negative impact of wealthy Chinese 
citizens’ migration abroad on the Chinese economy, middle-class citizens who are more likely to 
support democratic change leave China through migration, which indirectly takes pressure off the 
state. If the Chinese middle class did not have such a choice of moving to other countries, they 
might be more willing to support democratic change in China. 
The theoretical implication of this study is threefold. First, it is theoretically beneficial to 
study the middle class as an actor in democratization. As units that depict the dynamics of social 
stratification during social and economic advancement, social classes summarize various social 
groups’ positions in a given society and outline the characteristics of groups that share more or 
less common backgrounds, income levels, political interests, and lifestyle. The middle class, as 
described by Lipset and many other scholars, possess a natural tendency toward democracy. With 
the general understanding of the middle class and a grasp of its overall political interests, scholars 
can develop theories that more concisely explain political phenomena in a given society. 
Second, although displaying common socioeconomic characteristics and certain shared 
values, the middle class is not a monolithic entity, and, consequently, not a monolithic political 
actor. Scholars have long observed the fluidity and inconsistency of the middle-class political 
attitude toward democratic change, which can partly be explained by its fragmentation or lack of 
coherence. Each subgroup of the middle class is facing a unique social, economic, and political 
context, and they react differently to various conditions. As a result, the middle class not only 
needs to be carefully defined as a social group, but also needs to be discreetly disaggregated. 
Instead of using the middle class as a “catch-all” expression, and studying it as a homogeneous 
entity, it is more effective to distinguish subgroups of the middle class, analyze their interests, and 
 39 
reach explanations for political behavior based on their complexity and fragmentation. Moreover, 
it is also important to take into account the state’s sensitivity to these cleavages, and its capacity 
to exploit conflicts among the middle-class subgroups.  
Third, new circumstances have emerged during recent economic development and 
globalization. One example is middle class’ migration to democratic countries to escape 
authoritarian rule, which disrupts the middle class’ support for democratic change. Another 
example is the closer tie between urban white-collar employees and the rural population because 
of both internal migration and the expansion of higher education, which also affects the middle 
class’ political attitude and the state’s strategy of managing the middle class. In the era of Lipset 
and the development of the modernization theory, scholars did not foresee the emergence of these 
new circumstances. Theory should always be grounded in empirical realities—and the world is 
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